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Alcoholics and illicit drug users often consume a wide variety of drugs (Ball
and Ross 1991; Hubbard et al. 1989; Hammersley, Forsyth, and Lavelle 1990).
For example, 50, 33, 47, and 69 percent ofheroin addicts applying for meth-
adone treatment are regular users of alcohol, benzodiazepines, cocaine, and
marijuana, respectively (Ball and Ross 1991). Prevalence of marijuana use
among cocaine- and alcohol-dependent patients ranges from 25 to 70 percent
(Higgins et al. 1991; Hubbard 1990; Miller, Gold, and Pottash 1989; Schmitz
et al. 1991). Polydrug abuse presents a range of problems to treatment and
public health initiatives. For example, the overwhelming majority of drug-
related hospital emergency room visits involve combinations of alcohol and
multiple illicit drug use (NIDA 1991). Polydrug abuse also increases likeli-
hood ofoverdose (Risser and Schneider 1994; Ruttenber and Luke 1984), HIV
risk-taking behavior (Darke et al. 1994; Klee et al. 1990), and poor treatment
compliance (e.g., Ball and Ross 1991).
One problem in trying to understand polydrug abuse is that no descriptive
method has been designed to characterize it. For example, polydrug abuse re-
fers to the use oftwo drugs together (e.g., "speedball") and the use ofdrugs in
place ofone another (e.g., using barbiturates or benzodiazepines when alcohol
is not available). An understanding ofvariables that affect the use ofdifferent
drugs may elucidate factors that precipitate and propagate drug abuse and de-
pendence.
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8.1 Behavioral Economic Analysis and Its Putative
Relationship to Polydrug Abuse
Price is one variable that seems intricately related to drug use. Economists
are devoted to the proposition that higher prices will lower consumption of
almost any good (e.g., Mansfield 1988), and considerable evidence suggests
that drug consumption responds to changes in price. For example, alcohol and
nicotine use both decrease as their respective prices increase (e.g., Becker,
Grossman, and Murphy 1994). The interrelationship between price and con-
sumption ofillicit drugs, however, has been difficult to assess. Because drugs
are bought and sold in a volatile market and in varying purities, very little data
exist on how prices affect polydrug abuse in natural settings. In particular, how
the price ofone drug may affect the use ofother drugs is not well understood.
Behavioral economics is an analytic research area that applies consumer
demand theory to the study ofbehavior, and these theories have been applied
successfully to drug dependence issues in laboratory experiments ofdrug self-
administration (e.g., Bickel et al. 1990, 1991, 1995; DeGrandpre et al. 1993).
Cross-price elasticity (Ecross) can be determined using equation (1) derived
from Allison (1983):
(1) Ecross = (logQA2 - logQAl)/(log~2 - 10g~1)'
where Q is quantity consumed ofreinforcerA at price B1 or B2. Positive Ecross
values indicate that reinforcer A is a substitute for reinforcer B, and negative
Ecross values indicate that reinforcer B is a complement ofreinforcer A. Values
around°indicate that reinforcerA is independent ofreinforcer B (Bickel, De-
Grandpre, and Higgins 1995; Green and Freed 1993; Hursh 1980, 1991, 1993;
Samuelson and Nordhaus 1985).
Own-price elasticity (Eown) can be calculated using an equation from Alli-
son (1983):
(2) Eown = (logQA2 - logQAl)/(log~2 - log~l)'
where Q is the quantity of reinforcer A purchased at price (P) 1 or 2. When
price and consumption data are plotted on log-log coordinates, the slope be-
tween any two points represents Eown' with slopes < -1 representing elastic
demand and slopes> -1 representing inelastic demand (e.g., DeGrandpre and
Bickel 1996; DeGrandpre, et al. 1994; Hursh 1980, 1991, 1993; Samuelson
and Nordhaus 1985).
Elasticity can also be assessed by examining consumption following income
manipulations. Income elasticities (Einc) can be determined from equation (2),
with P being income. Values of Einc greater than 1 are indicative of elastic
demand, with purchases rising in greater proportion than the rise in income.
Values ofEinc less than 1 are indicative ofincome inelastic demand, with pur-
chases not rising in proportion to income. When consumption and income are215 Polydrug Abuse
plotted on log-log coordinates, income elastic demand is demonstrated by a
slope of ~ 1 and income inelastic demand by a slope of < 1 (DeGrandpre et
al. 1993).
These concepts of cross-price, own-price, and income elasticities have
been tested empirically in laboratory experiments ofdrug self-administration.
Bickel, DeGrandpre, and Higgins (1995) reviewed 16 studies in which two
reinforcers, one or both ofwhich were drugs, were concurrently available and
prices (usually in terms of the number of lever presses required for a unit of
drug) were altered. Cross-price elasticities indicated that some drugs were sub-
stitutes for others, some served as complements, and others were independents.
For example, in a group ofrhesus monkeys responding for concurrently avail-
able alcohol and PCP, increases in response requirements for PCP resulted in
an increase in responding for and consumption ofalcohol (Carroll 1987). Thus,
alcohol was a substitute for PCP. In terms of complements, both heroin and
cigarette self-administration decreased when the price ofheroin rose, indicat-
ing that cigarettes were a complement to heroin (Mello et al. 1980a). Cigarette
smoking also decreased as alcohol price rose in the majority ofsubjects in one
study (Mello et al. 1980b), but cigarette smoking was relatively independent
of alcohol price in another study (Mello, Mendelson, and Palmieri 1987).
Bickel et al. (1992) found that cigarette smoking and coffee consumption were
independent, regardless of whether the response requirement was raised for
cigarettes orcoffee. The relationship between concurrently available drug rein-
forcers was not always symmetrical, however. Although ethanol substituted for
PCP when the lever press requirement for PCP was raised, increases in the
response requirement for ethanol did not affect PCP self-administration (Car-
roll 1987).
In terms ofown-price elasticities, demand for alcohol was relatively inelas-
tic compared to demand for sucrose in rats with extensive alcohol histories
(Heyman and Oldfather 1992; Petry and Heyman 1995). Thus, responding for
alcohol persisted and increased as the response requirement for alcohol rose,
while responding for and consumption ofsucrose rapidly diminished when its
response requirements rose. Similarly, demand was inelastic for etonitazene
(Carroll and Meisch 1979), morphine (Dworkin et al. 1984), PCP (Carroll,
Carmona, and May 1991), coffee (Bickel et al. 1992), and nicotine (Bickel et
al. 1992) at some increases in price for these various drugs. However, at large
price increases, demand for these drugs often became elastic, and consumption
decreased proportionally greater than rises in price.
Income can be defined as the amount offunds, goods, or services available
to anyone individual at a given time (Pearce 1986). In behavioral terms, in-
come can be conceptualized as a constraint on total reinforcement possible to
earn in a laboratory session (e.g., total allotted time to respond ortotal number
ofresponses available). Increases in income can either increase ordecrease the
choice ofany particular good, depending on the type ofgood and the availabil-
ity of other goods (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980; Lea, Tarpy, and Webley216 Nancy M. Petry and Warren K. Bickel
1987). For example, choice for a large, bitter food pellet increased relative
to a small, normal pellet when income was decreased (Silberberg, Warren-
Boulton, and Asano 1987). Only one known laboratory study has examined
directly the effects of income on drug self-administration. DeGrandpre et al.
(1993) varied the amount of income available during experimental sessions,
while prices remained constant. Subjects were nicotine-dependent smokers,
and they could purchase puffs on their preferred brand of cigarettes or on a
less-preferred brand of cigarettes during the sessions. Puffs on the less-
preferred brand were less expensive than puffs on the preferred brand. In low-
income conditions, subjects purchased more puffs from the normally nonpre-
ferred brand. As income increased, puffs on the preferred brand increased, and
demand for the preferred cigarettes was income elastic (DeGrandpre et al.
1993).
These economic relationships ofcross-price, own-price, and income elastic-
ities may be useful in describing and predicting drug use in natural situations
as well as in these laboratory settings (Bickel and DeGrandpre 1995, 1996;
Hursh 1991). For example, as heroin price increases, heroin addicts may sub-
stitute less expensive opioids (methadone) or drugs from other classes that
abate opioid withdrawal symptoms (e.g., benzodiazepines). Demand for drugs
that produce physical dependence may be relatively inelastic among dependent
individuals, with increases in price not greatly affecting consumption. Analysis
of income elasticity of demand may show that as one has more disposable
money, consumption ofcertain drugs (e.g., heroin and cocaine) may increase
markedly, while consumption of other drugs may remain relatively constant
(e.g., marijuana).
8.2 Description ofSimulation Methodology
Systematic investigation of the relationship between price and polydrug
abuse in natural settings is hindered by the illicit nature of many drugs of
abuse. Drugs are bought at fluctuating prices and variable purities. While these
relationships can be studied in the laboratory, logistical and ethical considera-
tions ofproviding drugs to drug abusers remain. Behavioral simulation experi-
ments involve simulation ofessential aspects ofa situation in order to elicit the
behavior in question. If behavior that emerges in the simulation is similar to
that observed in natural situations, then processes responsible for the behavior
have likely been identified (Epstein 1986). Such simulations have been used
successfully in experimental economics such that resultant data is predictive
ofbehavior in the real world (Plott 1986).
This chapter describes a behavioral simulation paradigm that was developed
to apply a behavioral economic analysis to the phenomena ofpolydrug abuse
(Petry and Bickel 1998). Polydrug abusing heroin addicts were given imitation
money, and prices of drugs were indicated on paper. Subjects indicated the
types and quantities ofdrugs they would buy, presuming they had the available217 Polydrug Abuse
amount ofmoney to spend. Changes in drug choices were examined as a func-
tion ofprice and money available.
The subjects were 40 patients in our outpatient programs for opioid abuse
and dependence. Of those enrolled in the clinic, 96 percent volunteered, and
therefore the sample tested was representative ofour clinic population. Fifteen
subjects were female, and 25 were male. On average, subjects were in treat-
ment for 3.8 months (range 3 weeks to 16 months). Thirty-two ofthe subjects
were receiving buprenorphine (an alternative to methadone), five were receiv-
ing naltrexone (an opioid antagonist that prevents relapse to opioid abuse), and
three were no longer receiving medication. One subject was receiving Anta-
buse. Average age was 35, and average years ofeducation was 12. Average le-
gal monthly income was $750, and in the month prior to intake, subjects used
an average of$350 worth ofopioids each week. On average, subjects reported
a 10-year history of heroin dependence, and intravenous use was the route of
choice for all but6 subjects, who used heroin intranasally. In the month priorto
intake, 65, 68, 60, and 55 percentofsubjects reported alcohol, benzodiazepine,
cocaine, and marijuana use, respectively.
A sample of the stimuli used for these experiments is shown in appendix
figure 8A.1. Various drugs, in amounts typically used for a "hit," are presented.
The prices are representative ofVermont street prices, as determined by infor-
mal survey. A copy of the imitation money used in these studies is shown at
the bottom of the figure. The experiment commenced with the experimenter
reading instructions that subjects were to presume that they were not in treat-
ment and were actively abusing drugs. Subjects were also told that they had a
certain amount of "money" that they could "spend" on drugs each day, and
that they could not receive drugs from any other source, other than those they
"bought" with the allotted money. The subjects were further instructed to pre-
sume that the drugs they "purchased" were for their own personal consumption
only, and that all drugs "purchased" in this hypothetical situation could only
be used in a 24-hour period. They were told that they could not "sell" drugs
that they "purchased" or save them up for later.
8.2.1 Effects ofHeroin Price on Demand for Heroin,
Valium, Cocaine, Marijuana, and Alcohol
In experiment 1 (Petry and Bickel 1998), we examined the cross-price elas-
ticities ofdemand for valium, cocaine, alcohol, and marijuana using equation
(1), and the own-price elasticity ofdemand for heroin using equation (2). Four
trials were presented in which heroin prices varied between the trials; heroin
was available at $3, $6, $11, and $35 per bag. Income was kept constant at
$30 per trial, and prices of valium, cocaine, alcohol, and marijuana remained
constant at local street prices: valium was $1 per pill, cocaine was $15 per 1/8
ounce, alcohol was $1 per drink, and marijuana was $5 perjoint.
The top panel offigure 8.1 shows heroin purchases as a function ofheroin
price. Statistical analyses indicated that heroin purchases differed significantly218 Nancy M. Petry and Warren K. Bickel
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Fig. 8.1 Mean units ofheroin, valium, alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine
purchased as heroin increases in price from $3 to $35 perbag
Note: Dataare plottedin log-log coordinates such that the slope between any two successive points
is equal to the Eown or Ecross values listed in table 8.1. Purchases that differ significantly from the
$3 heroin price condition are denoted by solid symbols. No heroin purchases were made in the
$35 heroin price condition since price exceeded income, and therefore no symbol is plotted for
heroin in this condition. See text for further details.
across the three price conditions in which heroin could be purchased, and val-
ues significantly different from the $3 condition are denoted by solid symbols.
Note that across all conditions, subjects tended to spend a large proportion of
their $30 income on heroin. In the $3 price condition, the mean number of
bags ofheroin purchased was over eight; in the $6 condition, mean purchases219 Polydrug Abuse
Table 8.1 Own-Price Elasticity Coefficients ofHeroin and Cross-Price
Elasticity Coefficients ofOther Drugs Determined from Mean
Units Purchased
Heroin Price ($ per bag) Heroin Valium Alcohol Marijuana Cocaine
3
6 -0.861 0.380 1.311 0.000 -4.170
11 -1.258 1.686 0.188 0.409 2.655
35 1.015 0.181 0.726 2.203
Slope ofbest-fitting line -1.042 1.056 0.451 0.464 0.822
was just under five bags; and in the $11 condition, mean purchases was two
bags.
Data are plotted on log-log coordinates, such that the slope between any two
successive points is equal to the Eown values shown in table 8.1. As heroin
increased in price from $3 to $6, the own-price elasticity ofdemand was - .86.
This value suggests that demand for heroin was inelastic, and increases in price
were associated with decreases in purchases that were proportionally smaller
than the price increments. Demand for heroin became more elastic as its price
increased further, from $6 to $11, with own-price elasticity of demand equal
to -1.26.
The top panel of figure 8.2 shows the percent of subjects demonstrating
elastic and inelastic demand for heroin as its price rose. When heroin doubled
in price from $3 to $6, over 85 percent of subjects showed inelastic demand
for heroin, but as price increased further to $11 and $35, demand for heroin
became elastic in the majority ofsubjects.
The price of heroin affected not only heroin purchases but purchases of
other drugs as well. When heroin was inexpensive, subjects tended not to pur-
chase valium, and the average number ofvalium pills purchased was less than
1 (fig. 8.1). However, as heroin price rose, valium purchases significantly in-
creased, and the number of valium pills purchased in the $11 and $35 heroin
conditions differed significantly from the number ofpills purchased in the $3
heroin condition. In the $35 heroin price condition, for example, subjects pur-
chased an average of10 valiumpills. Ecross values for valium were high, ranging
from .38 to 1.69, with an overall slope of 1.06, indicative ofa strong substitu-
tion effect (table 8.2). Figure 8.2 shows that approximately 50 percent ofsub-
jects substituted valium for heroin as heroin prices rose.
Average alcohol and marijuana purchases also increased, but not signifi-
cantly, with heroin price. In low heroin price conditions, the average number
ofalcoholic drinks and marijuanajointspurchased was less than one. As heroin
price rose, purchases ofthese drugs increased, but the mean number ofdrinks
and joints purchased was under three, even in the condition in which subjects
were unable to buy heroin (heroin = $35). E cross values averaged about 0.5
for both marijuana and alcohol, indicative ofa relatively independent or weak
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Fig. 8.2 Percent ofsubjects demonstrating own- and cross-price demand
elasticities
Note: This figure shows the percentage of subjects demonstrating inelastic or elastic demand for
heroin as the price ofheroin increased in experiment 1, and the percentage ofsubjects demonstra-
ting a complement, independent, or substitution relationship between valium, marijuana, alcohol,
and cocaine purchases as heroin price increased in experiment 1. See text for further details.221 Polydrug Abuse
Table 8.2 Elasticity Coefficients for Mean Units Purchased as Heroin Price Increases
Heroin Price Valium Price Own-Price Cross-Price Cross-Price Cross-Price
($ per bag) ($ per pill) Heroin Valium Marijuana Alcohol
3 0.33
6 0.33 -0.897 -0.678 -0.735 -0.322
11 0.33 -1.317 2.502 0.841 1.263
35 0.33 0.986 1.576 1.038
Slope ofbest-
fitting line -1.088 1.024 0.819 0.780
3
6 -0.923 0.186 -0.325 -0.651
11 -1.232 1.217 0.371 1.220
35 1.252 1.518 0.438
Slope ofbest-
fitting line -1.064 0.990 0.746 0.403
3 3
6 3 -0.874 0.416 -1.000 -1.469
11 3 -1.322 0.842 2.069 1.923
35 3 1.328 1.338 0.223
Slope ofbest-
fitting line -1.064 0.990 0.746 0.403
3 10
6 10 -0.904 0.000 -0.996 -0.214
11 10 -1.233 2.953 1.613 1.834
35 10 0.234 1.199 0.254
Slope ofbest-
fitting line -1.054 0.929 0.797 0.594
were independent ofheroin price in the majority of subjects across all heroin
price conditions.
In contrast to the lack of a significant effect on alcohol and marljuana pur-
chases, cocaine purchases were significantly affected by heroin price. As de-
noted by filled symbols in figure 8.1, the number of cocaine purchases in the
$6 and $35 heroin conditions was significantly different from the number of
purchases in the $3 heroin condition. Cocaine was a complement when heroin
price increased from $3 to $6 per bag, but it became a substitute as heroin
price continued to rise (table 8.1). While the group mean purchases demon-
strated this complement and substitution effect as heroin price rose, this effect
occurred in only 23 percent of subjects (fig. 8.2). In the majority of subjects,
demand for cocaine was independent ofheroin price.
8.2.2 Symmetry ofSubstitutability ofHeroin and Valium
Effect ofHeroin Price on Demandfor Valium, Alcohol, andMarijuana
In experiment 2 (Petry and Bickel 1998), we altered the prices ofboth heroin
and valium to determine whether cross-price elasticities between these two222 Nancy M. Petry and Warren K. Bickel
drugs were symmetrical or asymmetrical. This experimentcontained 16 condi-
tions, presented in a random order to 18 subjects. Heroin prices varied ($3, $6,
$11, and $35 perbag), and at each heroin price condition, valium was available
at $0.33, $1, $3, and $10 per pill. Income was constant at $30, and marijuana
and alcohol prices were $5 and $1, respectively. In addition to providing cross-
price elasticities, this study provided estimates of the own-price elasticity of
demand for valium in heroin addicts. This experiment also provided estimates
ofthe own-price elasticity of demand for heroin when cocaine was not avail-
able and in a new group ofsubjects, none ofwhom participated in study 1.
Figure 8.3 shows drug purchases as heroin price increased in experiment 2.
Four panels are shown, one for each valium price condition. Statistical analy-
ses demonstrated that valium purchases were significantly affected by heroin




















Fig. 8.3 Mean units ofheroin, valium, alcohol, and marijuana purchased as
heroin price increases from $3 to $35 perbag
Note: Panels show this data for the $0.33, $1, $3, and $10 valium price conditions. Purchases that
differ significantly from the $3 heroin price condition are denoted by filled symbols. No heroin
purchases were made in the $35 heroin price condition since price exceeded income, and therefore
no symbol is plotted for heroin in this condition. See text for further details.223 Polydrug Abuse
quantities ofvalium, with an average of4 pills purchased even when they con-
currently purchased eight bags ofheroin. As heroin price rose to $35 per bag,
valium purchases increased to an average of40 and 20 pills in the $0.33 and $1
valium price conditions, respectively. While the quantities ofvalium purchased
were lower in conditions in which valium was more expensive ($3 and $10 per
pill), valium purchases nevertheless increased significantly as heroin price rose
(range from less than 1 to over 6 pills).
Table 8.2 shows cross-price elasticity values for valium as heroin price rose.
Regardless ofthe price ofvalium, E cross values indicated that demand for val-
ium was relatively independent of heroin price when heroin price increased
from $3 to $6 per bag. However, as heroin prices increased further to $11 and
$35, valium tended to become a strong substitute for heroin, with cross-price
elasticities ranging from .23 to 1.32. Across the four heroin price conditions,
the overall cross-price elasticities for valium ranged from .93 to 1.02. These
values are indicative of a strong substitute relationship between valium pur-
chases and heroin prices.
Table 8.3 shows the percentage of subjects demonstrating a substitution,
complement, orindependent relationship betweenheroinprice and valium pur-
chases. In the majority ofsubjects, valium purchases were generally indepen-
dent ofheroin price when heroin was inexpensive ($3 to $6). However, valium
became a substitute for heroin in the majority ofsubjects as heroin prices in-
creased further. Over halfofthe subjects substituted valium for heroin at some
or all ofthe different valium price conditions as heroin prices rose.
Heroin price also significantly affected purchases ofmarijuana in some con-
ditions (fig. 8.3). E cross values for marijuana were negative (-.325 to -1.0) as
heroin rose from $3 to $6, indicating that marijuana was an independent or
complement to heroin when the price ofheroin was relatively low. As heroin
prices increased further, Ecross values were positive, indicating that marijuana
became a substitute for heroin. Table 8.3 shows that approximately 30 percent
of subjects substituted marijuana for heroin in high heroin price conditions,
but the majority ofsubjects showed an independent relationship between her-
oin price and marijuana purchases.
Similar to marijuana, E cross values for alcohol were negative as heroin in-
creased from $3 to $6, indicating that alcohol was an independent or comple-
ment to heroin. As the price ofheroin increased further to $11 and $35 perbag,
alcohol purchases rose slightly, with elasticities ranging from .223 (indepen-
dent) to 1.923 (strong substitute). Only in the conditions in which valium was
very inexpensive ($0.33) or very expensive ($10) did alcohol purchases sig-
nificantly increase with heroin price. Approximately 70 percent of subjects
showed an independent relationship between heroin price and alcohol pur-
chases (table 8.3).
Similar to experiment 1, heroin purchases significantly decreased as heroin
price increased (fig. 8.3). Eown values for heroin were remarkably similar re-















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































inelastic demand for heroin when its price increased from $3 to $6 (table 8.3),
but the majority of subjects demonstrated elastic demand for heroin as prices
for heroin increased further.
Effect ofValium Price on DemandforHeroin, Alcohol, andMarijuana
Figure 8.4 shows the same data from experiment 2, but as a function of
valium price. The four panels show the number ofdrug purchases at each her-
oin price condition. Heroin purchases were not significantly affected by the
price ofvalium. In contrast to the substitution effect ofvalium for heroin, table
8.4 shows that Ecross values for heroin were extremely small (0.000 to -0.047)
when valium prices rose. Thus, heroin purchases were independent ofvalium
prices. Likewise, alcohol and marijuana purchases did not vary significantly
with valium price. E cross values for alcohol and marijuana were small, indicat-














































Fig. 8.4 Mean units ofheroin, valium, alcohol, and marijuana purchased as
valium price increases from $0.33 to $10 per pill
Note: Panels show this data for the $3, $6, $11, and $35 heroin price conditions. Purchases that
differ significantly from the $0.33 valium price condition are denoted by filled symbols. No heroin
purchases were made in the $35 heroin price condition since price exceededincome, and therefore
no symbol is plotted for heroin in this condition. See text for further details.226 Nancy M. Petry and Warren K. Bickel
Table 8.4 Elasticity Coefficients for Mean Units Purchased as Valium Price Increases
Valium Price Heroin Price Own-Price Cross-Price Cross-Price Cross-Price
($ per Pill) ($ per Bag) Valium Heroin Marijuana Alcohol
0.33 3
1 3 -0.820 -0.031 0.000 0.250
3 3 -1.065 -0.006 -0.205 0.262
10 3 -0.911 -0.006 0.337 -0.346
Slope ofbest-
fitting line -0.944 -0.013 0.300 0.061
0.33 6
1 6 -0.280 -0.047 0.257 0.044
3 6 -0.920 0.024 -0.631 -0.307
10 6 -1.150 -0.022 0.339 0.425
Slope ofbest-
fitting line -0.809 -0.011 -0.059 0.032
0.33 11
1 11 -0.982 0.000 0.000 0.021
3 11 -1.128 -0.026 0.306 0.134
10 11 -7.737 0.024 0.110 0.331
Slope ofbest-
fitting line -1.055 -0.002 0.154 0.165
0.33 35
1 35 -0.705 -0.060 -0.606
3 35 -1.047 0.118 -0.092
10 35 -1.091 -0.025 0.362
Slope ofbest-
fitting line -0.962 0.020 -0.094
Table 8.5 shows the percentage of subjects demonstrating a substitution,
complement, or independent relationship between valium price and purchases
ofheroin, alcohol, and marijuana. Heroin purchases were independent ofval-
ium price in every subject across all conditions studied. Marijuana and alcohol
purchases also tended to be independentofvalium price inmost subjects. Only
in one condition (heroin at $11 per bag, and valium increasing from $3 to
$10) did one-third ofthe subjects demonstrate a substitution effect ofalcohol
for valium.
Although the price ofvalium did not significantly affect purchases ofheroin,
marijuana, or alcohol, figure 8.4 shows that valium price significantly affected
valium purchases. As valium prices rose, valium purchases decreased. Table
8.4 shows that demand for valium was inelastic with initial changes in valium
price ($0.33 to $1 per pill), but demand for valium became more elastic as its
price increased further, and the slopes between price conditions tended to be
less than -1. Table 8.5 also shows the percentage of subjects demonstrating
inelastic and elastic demand for valium. Across all conditions, demand for val-
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8.2.3 Effects ofIncome on Demand for Drugs
In experiment 3 (Petry and Bickel 1998), we examined income elasticities
by varying the amount ofmoney available: $30, $100, $156, $300, and $560.
Prices were constant at all conditions: heroin was $35 per bag, valium was $1
per pill, marijuana was $5 perjoint, alcohol was $1 perdrink, and cocaine was
$15 per 1/8 ounce. The same 22 subjects who participated in experiment 1par-
ticipated in this study. Thus, a total of nine conditions (the four heroin price
conditions from experiment 1, and the five income conditions from experiment
3) were presented in a random order to each ofthese subjects.
Increases in income were associated with statistically significant increases
in the total number ofbags ofheroin purchased, as shown in figure 8.5. When
subjects had $100 available, they purchased an average of 1.7 bags ofheroin.
As income increased to $156, an average of3 bags ofheroin was purchased. In
the $560 income condition, subjects purchased an average ofover 10 bags of
heroin. Income elasticity coefficients were high for heroin (table 8.6). An in-
crease in income from $100 to $156 was associated with a steep rise in heroin
purchase (slope == 1.58), indicative of an income elastic demand for heroin.
But as income increased further, the slope of the line between successive in-
comes became slightly lower, and demand for heroin became income inelastic.
The slope ofthe best-fitting line between the four conditions in which heroin
could be purchased, however, was greater than 1 and indicative of an income
elastic demand for heroin.
Income did not significantly affect valium purchases. The income elasticity
coefficients for valium were negative in the conditions in which subjects re-
ceived a relatively low income, demonstrating a nonsignificant decrease in val-
ium purchases at initial increases in income. The slope ofthe best-fitting line
across all income conditions was close to 0, indicating that overall income did
not affect valium purchases. Marijuana purchases showed a similar trend, but
again income did not significantly affect purchases. Alcohol purchases like-
wise increased marginally, but not significantly, with each successive increase
in income.
Cocaine purchases, however, increased significantly with income (fig. 8.5),
and demand for cocaine was income elastic in the two highest income condi-
tions (table 8.6). The slope of the best-fitting line between the four income
levels was positive (.71) butless than that ofheroin. Thus, over the five income
conditions tested, income significantly affected cocaine purchases, butdemand
for cocaine was income inelastic overall.
Figure 8.6 shows the percentage of subjects showing income elastic or in-
come inelastic demand for each drug across the income levels. Ateach succes-
sive increase in income, over 50 percent ofthe subjects demonstrated income
elastic demand for heroin, suggesting that heroin purchases increased propor-
tionally greater than rises in income. Between the $156 and $560 conditions,
demand for cocaine was income elastic in about 40 percent of the subjects.229 Polydrug Abuse
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Fig. 8.5 Mean units ofheroin, valium, alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine
purchased as income increases from $30 to $560
Note: Data are plotted in log-log coordinates such that the slope between any two successive points
is equal to the Eine values listed in table 8.4. Purchases that differ significantly from the $30 income
condition (or $100 income condition for heroin only) are denoted by filled symbols. No heroin
purchases were made in the $30 income condition since price exceeded income, and therefore no
symbol is plotted for heroin in this condition. See text for further details.
Less than 25 percent ofthe subjects showed income elastic demand for any of
the other drugs across the income conditions.
8.3 Summary ofFindings
Three major findings emerged from these studies (Petry and Bickel 1998).
First, these data show that the price of heroin affects the purchase of some230 Nancy M. Petry and Warren K. Bickel
Table 8.6 Income Elasticity Coefficients Determined from Mean
Units Purchased
Income ($) Heroin Valium Alcohol Marijuana Cocaine
30
100 -0.335 0.075 0.200 0.359
156 1.583 -1.310 0.320 -1.175 -0.757
300 0.912 0.912 0.651 0.231 1.671
560 0.863 0.759 0.680 1.376 1.617
Slope ofbest-fitting line 1.038 -0.004 0.370 0.152 0.708
other drugs; notably, increases in heroin price resulted in increases in valium
and cocaine purchases. Second, as heroin prices increased, own-price elasticit-
ies indicated that demand for heroin was relatively inelastic at low prices but
elastic at higher prices. Third, as income rose, heroin and cocaine purchases
increased, but other drug purchases remained unchanged.
When heroin price rose in experiments 1 and 2, purchase of valium in-
creased. Cross-price elasticity coefficients indicated that valium was a substi-
tute for heroin in most subjects. Cocaine was also a substitute for heroin, but
only in a minority ofsubjects. An independent or weak substitute relationship
was found between heroin price and the purchase ofmarijuana and alcohol.
Experiment 2 demonstrates an asymmetric substitution effect between her-
oin and valium. While over 50 percent of subjects substituted valium for her-
oin, no subjects substituted heroin for valium. Heroin purchases were inde-
pendent of valium prices in all subjects across all conditions. Alcohol and
marijuana purchases were independent ofvalium price as well. Together, these
results suggest that increases in price for heroin may increase the use ofother
drugs, notably valium and cocaine, but that increases in the price for valium
are unlikely to affect other drug use in this population.
Own-price elasticity coefficients indicated that demand for valium and her-
oin was relatively inelastic. In experiment 2, subjects defended valium pur-
chases as price increased, and demand for valium was inelastic in over halfof
the subjects. Similarly, in the first two experiments, heroin purchases defended
rises in price such that as heroin price doubled from $3 to $6 per bag, pur-
chases of heroin decreased by less than half. However, as heroin price rose
further to $11 and $35 perbag, demand for heroin became elastic, and the near
quadrupling in price from $3 to $11 per bag resulted in a greater than fourfold
reduction in heroin purchases.
In terms ofthe relationship between income and drug purchases in the third
experiment, subjects consistently purchased more heroin as they had more
money to spend. Income elasticity coefficients indicated that demand for her-
oin was income elastic as income rose from $100 to $156, and heroin pur-
chases rose in greater proportions than incomes. At higher income conditions,
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proportionally greater than increases in income. Demand for cocaine was in-
come elastic at high incomes ($156 to $560), and these income levels resulted
in significant increases in cocaine purchases compared to the lower income
conditions. Purchases ofother drugs did not vary significantly with income. In
summary, income was most likely to affect purchase ofheroin and, to a lesser232 Nancy M. Petry and Warren K. Bickel
extent, cocaine; purchases ofvalium, marijuana, and alcohol were unlikely to
change with increasing incomes.
8.4 Reliability and Validity ofthe Simulation
These data were reliable both between and within subjects. In experiments
1 and 3, each subject was exposed to 9 conditions in a random order. Two of
the conditions were identical ($30 income and prices of all drugs at current
street value), and 17 of22 subjects made purchases from the same drug catego-
ries in the two exposures to this condition. In experiment 2, 18 new subjects
participated. Sixteen conditions were included, and 4 ofthese ($3, $6, $11, and
$35 for heroin and valium at $1 per pill) were virtually identical to a condition
in experiment 1, with the exception ofcocaine being available only in experi-
ment 1. Own-price elasticity coefficients for heroin were virtually identical in
the two groups ofsubjects (compare tables 8.1 and 8.2).
To assess relationships between self-reports ofdrug choice in the simulation
and actual drug use, we compared drug purchases during the simulation to
objective indicators of drug use in real life by these subjects. While in treat-
ment at the clinic, urine samples were collected on a random basis once per
week and screened for benzodiazepines, cocaine, marijuana, and opioids using
Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Technique (Syva Corp., San Jose, Calif.).
The percentage of urine samples that tested positive for benzodiazepines and
marijuana was significantly correlated (p < .001) with the number ofvalium
pills and marijuana purchases made during the simulation. Correlations were
conducted between Michigan Alcohol Screening Test scores (MAST, a mea-
sure of the severity of alcohol problems; Pokorny, Miller, and Kaplan 1972)
and units of alcohol purchased, and those results also approached levels of
statistical significance (p == .09). While these correlations do not suggest that
use ofthese drugs in real life is related to the demand elasticities ofthese drugs
in this simulation, they do provide preliminary evidence that subjects who
"purchase" valium, alcohol, and cocaine in large quantities in the simulation
are more likely to use these drugs frequently in real life.
Correlations between opioid-positive urine samples and heroin purchases
were not conducted because subjects were required to remain opioid abstinent
during treatment. Cocaine purchases were not significantly correlated with the
number of cocaine-positive urine samples. One explanation may be that co-
caine is more likely to be a complement to heroin than any of the other sub-
stances (table 8.1 and fig. 8.2). In natural settings, heroin addicts tend to use
cocaine when they are using heroin (speedball). Because subjects were re-
quired to remain opioid abstinent during treatment, their cocaine use may have
decreased concurrently with their heroin use. Therefore, cocaine urine results
during treatment may not have been correlated with the self-reported prefer-
ence for cocaine during.this simulation. Further research with non-treatment-
seeking drug users may clarify this issue and further validate this methodology.233 Polydrug Abuse
Although the data obtained from the simulation were reliable both between
and within subjects and urine results tended to corroborate drug selections in
the simulation, potential criticisms ofthe present findings are that all choices
were between hypothetical amounts of money and drugs and that all subjects
were involved in drug treatment. Whether or not drug abusers actually chose
these same amounts and types ofdrugs in natural settings is unclear. Despite
the hypothetical nature of the present simulation, spontaneous verbal reports
of subjects during participation in the study suggest that the simulation is re-
lated to the real-life experiences of these subjects. For example, one subject
reported that each time he receives his paycheck, he thinks back to when he
was doing drugs and how he would have allocated such a sum of money to
drugs prior to his entering treatment. Many subjects became excited in condi-
tions in which heroin prices were very low or when they received large sums
ofmoney with which to buy drugs, and several made statements such as, "It's
my lucky day!" Most subjects tried to "bargain" with the experimenter when
heroin price exceeded income, and some actually became upset with the exper-
imenterin these conditions. Several subjects tried to "rip off" the experimenter
by not "paying" the full amount for the drugs they had verbally requested or
by "stealing" the imitation money. The experimenter counted the money after
each trial, and confronted some subjects, to ensure that purchases matched
income in each trial.
8.5 Relationship between Findings from the Simulation
and Drug Use in Natural Settings
One of the main findings of these simulation experiments is that valium is
a strong substitute for heroin, and these results are consistent with clinical ob-
servations. Benzodiazepines are used to abate opioid withdrawal symptoms
during inpatient opioid detoxifications. It is not unreasonable to assume that
heroin addicts use more valium when heroin becomes too expensive or is un-
available in natural settings (e.g., Woods, Katz, and Winger 1987) and when
heroin addicts are detoxifying as outpatients (e.g., Green and Jaffe 1977; Green
et al. 1978).
Only one known study has provided an economic analysis ofthe substitut-
ability ofdrugs in natural settings. Chaloupka and Laixuthai (1994) found that
drinking frequency and heavy drinking episodes were negatively related to al-
cohol costs and minimum legal drinking age, but reductions in alcohol use
were associated with increases in marijuana use and marijuana-related car ac-
cidents. Thus, marijuana tends to be a substitute for alcohol among adoles-
cents.
In terms ofown-price elasticity ofdemand, these data show that demand for
heroin is inelastic during small changes in price but that demand becomes
more elastic at higher prices. Naturalistic research also demonstrates that de-
mand for heroin is relatively inelastic. For example, pooled cross-sectional234 Nancy M. Petry and Warren K. Bickel
time-series data on 41 neighborhoods in Detroit during the 1970s found the
own-price elasticity ofdemand for heroin to be -0.26 (Silverman and Spruill
1977). Van Ours (1995) also found the demand for opium in Indonesia during
the Dutch colonial period to be relatively inelastic, with own-price elasticity
values ranging from - .70 to -1.0. Nonetheless, the elastic demand for heroin
noted at high prices suggests that ifprices become high enough, use ofheroin
may decrease, even among dependent heroin addicts.
This relatively inelastic demand for heroin may have important social impli-
cations. If consumption decreases only slowly with increased price, one can
expectenhanced drug-seeking behavior associated with small price increments
(see also Bickel and DeGrandpre 1996). In other words, original consumption
levels may be maintained despite price increases by engaging in criminal activ-
ities and trading sex for drugs and money. Silverman and Spruill (1977) and
Brown and Silverman (1974) demonstrated that property crimes, as opposed
to nonproperty crimes like rape and murder, were positively and significantly
affectedby heroin price. Additionally, one canhypothesize that the use ofmore
efficient modes of drug taking, such as intravenous injection, may assist in
defending consumption levels against price increases.
Participation elasticity (sampling of drugs among nondependent individu-
als) may also be responsive to drug prices and/or income levels. For example,
using data from the National Household Survey ofDrug Abuse and the Drug
Enforcement Agency, Saffer and Chaloupka (1995) found that participation
elasticity is about - .90 to - .80 for heroin and about - .55 to - .36 for cocaine.
They estimate that legalization would lead to about a 60 percent decrease in
drug prices. These decreases in price are estimated to result in a 100 percent
increase in the quantity ofheroin consumed and a 50 percent increase in the
quantity ofcocaine consumed. Decriminalization ofmarijuana was estimated
to increase the probability ofmarijuana participation by only about 5 percent.
The relationship between demand elasticities derived from these statistical es-
timates and those obtained in simulation paradigms employing nondependent
recreational drug users may be ofinterest.
8.6 Conclusions and Future Applications
In summary, this simulation paradigm appears to be useful for examining
the relationship between drug prices and consumption. The data were reliable
between and within subjects, consistent with clinical observations ofpolydrug
abuse, and compatible with the limited amount of data relating drug prices to
consumption in natural settings. Further examination of the relationships be-
tween drug price and consumption using this simulation may elucidate preven-
tion and treatment strategies for drug abuse. In terms ofprevention, this pro-
cedure may serve as a gauge for at-risk recreational users. Nondependent
recreational users may demonstrate lower own-price demand elasticities than
dependent users, and individual differences in demand elasticities may be re-
lated to risk for dependency and/or response to treatment.235 Polydrug Abuse
In terms oftreatment, drug prices may be strongly associated with entry into
treatment. For example, Dupont and Greene (1973) demonstrated that metha-
done acceptability, as indicated by treatment entry, increases with rises in the
retail price of heroin. Similarly, in a series ofquestionnaires, Vermont heroin
addicts were asked to indicate whether they would use heroin, enter into treat-
ment, and withdraw from treatment as the price ofheroin varied from $1 per
bag to $100 per bag; price was strongly associated with self-reported use and
entry to treatment. Interestingly, once in treatment, these patients reported that
they were not likely to drop out oftreatment, although they were more likely
to use while in treatment when heroin price was low (Petry and Bickel, unpub-
lished data). Given the strong negative relationship between treatment for drug
use and HIV infection (e.g., Metzger et al. 1993), further exploration of the
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Comment on Chapters 7 and 8 A. Thomas McLellan
In reading the Petry and Bickel paper, I was immediately appreciative of Dr.
Petry's very clear discussion ofthe underlying premises and her use ofopera-
tional definitions for phrases and terms that were very foreign to this clinical
researcher. Terms like elasticity, substitution, complementarity, and endogen-
eity are as foreign to me as the terms discriminative stimulus, conditioned in-
hibitor, and selective seratonin reuptake inhibitormay be to many ofthe econo-
mists. After reading this paper I found myself prompted to use these new
economic terms to ask questions that might extend and clarify (at least for me)
some ofthe experiments reported upon in theirpaper. Forexample, I wondered
to what extent was the elasticity ofchoice among drug 1 versus drug 2 versus
no drug a function ofthe following variables, which themselves may be elastic:
1. history ofuse ofthe substances (dependence, abuse, use)
2. expected effects ofa the target amount and type ofdrug
3. cue-mediated arousal (i.e., advertising effectiveness, potency)
4. current dependent state (joint function of amount of last use, quality/
purity oflast use, time since last use, and use history)
Armed with these now clarified concepts-thatis, all the dangers associated
with a little knowledge-I will offer some suggestions on the Petry and Bickel
paper as well as some cautionary, general comments on the application ofeco-
nomic analyses with clinical populations. The Petry and Bickel paper is con-
cerned with what appears to be a very common economic concept-the in-
teraction of demands for two or more potentially interchangeable goods,
co-occurring within a consumer who has only a fixed amount ofmoney. Here
the overall question is, To what extent and under what conditions do economic
models and tests ofthose models pertain in the study ofpolydrug use? This is
a very important and timely issue, since as the authors note, this is common in
everyday life and is increasingly common in the treatment setting.
In this context, I was also intrigued by the authors' use ofthe "imagine if"
or "actas though" instruction to study these co-occurring demands. This could
serve as an importantlaboratory model for exploring the elasticity and comple-
mentarity issues. In this regard, I think that some calibration might be in order
to validate the approach and standardize its use-particularly in the case of
drugs with indeterminate potency and purities (e.g., heroin, cocaine, mari-
juana). Forexample, in the case ofcocaine, to the extent that these background
factors are importantin explaining the elasticity ofdemand and complementar-
ity ofdemand for other drugs, it might be useful to begin each subject with a
series ofstandardized slides (presented in random orderand repeated) showing
graduated amounts ofcrack and asking the subject to "indicate the slide that is
worth $10, $20, or $30, under conditions where you had the amount and didn't
A. Thomas McLellan is professor of psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania, the senior
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require it for immediate needs." This would be the equivalent ofstandardizing
scores on a test and would allow direct comparisons among individuals. A
second methodological point that might be useful in validating the use ofthe
paradigm would be to repeat the initial "worth-estimating questions" at later
points in the course ofthe drug comparisons.
Moving from the methodological comments to my comments about the na-
ture of the research, I must say that this paper and this conference have pro-
voked me with some new questions regarding the nature ofdrug dependence.
I should first reiterate that I am a clinicalresearcher working within a treatment
setting that is part of a health care system. I have come to believe that the
extreme (epidemiologically and socially) behaviors that are the subject ofthis
conference-like heroin and cocaine dependence-are "diseases;' and that
among the more appropriate and efficient means of dealing with them is
through the application ofmore or less standard treatment interventions within
a health care setting-paid for with health insurance. Therefore, within this
conference, the premise that has been most interesting to me was stated early
by Dr. Henry Saffer: that demand, price, and income parameters affect the
consumption of alcohol, cocaine, and opiates under "the same theoretical de-
mand model that is used for other goods" (section 7.3.1). It is important to
note that from a treatment perspective, use of all of these drugs has not been
conceptualized as being on a smooth continuum ofamount, duration, and fre-
quency, but rather on a discontinuum, with important breaks at various points.
Use, use-to-intoxication, problematic use, and even abuse are (depending upon
the operational definitions and measures used) on some type of continuum
based on amount, frequency, duration, and consequences ofuse. However, de-
pendence in the psychiatric diagnostic sense is specifically defined as use that
is "out ofcontrol;' "continued despite clear negative consequences," "use that
is out of volitional control;' and "not rational"; this is why it is called addic-
tion-toset itapart as adisease state, separate from otherso-calledrational be-
haviors.
Thus, as a clinical researcher, I was immediately confronted by an assump-
tion that runs contrary to the foundation of why dependence is considered a
medical disorder and why it needs treatment instead of simple exogenous be-
havioral controls such as might be supplied by the criminal justice system or
the laws and economic conditions of an economy or government. I think this
may be important for both ofour disciplines to study. It strikes me that if the
laws ofrational economics apply reasonably well to the exchange of money,
effort, or other barterable commodities for drugs-underconditions where the
individual meets contemporary criteria for a substance dependence disorder-
such a finding will cast doubt on one ofthe fundamental assumptions underly-
ing medially oriented treatments for substance dependence. In tum, such a
finding might help us all to consider new forms of interventions designed to
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also If this line of research fails to confirm the expected operation of these
fundamental principles of economics when applied to drug exchange among
addicted individuals, it could provide some important considerations on the
operation ofexchange principles under "irrational" demand conditions.
My final comments focus on the overall nature of the work that has been
presented over these past two days-again, from the perspective of a clinical
researcher. In this regard, I will conclude with three general requests of the
economic researchers-based on the data presented at this conference:
Please continue to study these issues. It is apparent that economic principles,
assumptions, and analytic methods may be important tools in the study ofpre-
vention and treatment ofuse, abuse, and dependence.
Please study populations that are dependent (in the psychiatric diagnostic
sense) as well as large general populations. However, I urge caution in the
implications drawn and even the titles of articles. Please don't use the words
abuse and dependence in titles ofarticles unless those definitions are clarified.
As indicated above, these words have multiple meanings to workers in these
fields. Please be careful in generalizing to clinical populations and to behaviors
that may fall under additional-possiblyqualitatively different-mechanisms.
I say this because, often, economists and economic findings are used by
policy makers. It may be that some of the governmental policies that derive
from economic findings will apply nicely to those who have not yet used (pre-
vention) or those who are using at relatively low rates or amounts (users). But
it is at least possible that these same findings may have inaccurate implications
for those whose use is highest (those with histories ofdependence and/or those
with current dependence).
Get betterdata than have been presentedhere. The only area that has disap-
pointed me in this conference has been the nature ofsome ofthe data sets that
have been used for study and, I believe, a too rapid rush to generalize to clinical
populations. There is the understandable desire to work with large databases
that are publicly available. Many ofthe studies presented have used these data-
bases, I think without sufficient caution and critique. Too often, these data sets
were used in an attempt to study rather extreme or rare behaviors such as alco-
hol abuse or dependence. The databases used in several of these studies had
very few of these extreme cases, and often the nature, number, and precision
of the variables used to characterize these populations were inadequate for a
true test of some of the assumptions underlying the analyses. Too often, a
poorly defined variable was constructed to be used as a proxy for an important
construct-such as "abuse" or "dependence"-but without empirical or even
casual testing of the extent to which the proxy actually represented the con-
struct under study.
My plea to the economic researchers is this: Don't settle for this level ofdata
when there are far better and more informative data sets available. There are
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sured patient populations (i.e., abusing and dependent patients) available for
study. There are population-based data sets that use the same measures as clini-
cal samples. There are state-level data on treated populations with varying lev-
els oftreatment intensities, services, and controls on admission and treatment
length. There are field studies with fine-grained measures ofimportant behav-
iors that are socially relevant.
I am a council member ofthe National Institute on Drug Abuse and a member
of the Health Services Advisory Board for the National Institute on Alcohol
Abuse and Alcoholism. In that capacity, I can say that there is great interest in
the economic study ofthese data sets and populations from both ofthese agen-
cies. As a clinical researcher, I have been impressed with the power of the
economic methods employed in the studies presented here. My only caution is
that these methods should be explicitly tested in clinical populations prior to
assuming that the findings will generalize to those populations.
Comment on Chapters 7 and 8 MarkA. R. Kleiman
Addiction, Rationality, Behavior, and Measurement:
Some Comments on the Problems ofIntegrating
Econometric and Behavioral Economic Research
The general problem addressed by this conference is: What do econometrics
and behavioral economics have to say to one another, and to the broader world
of thought and policy making, about the phenomena of drug abuse? Asking
this question plunges us into deep and murky waters, both methodologically
and conceptually.
To start with some ofthe methodological problems:
Econometricians are the prisoners of their data sets. The data about drug
abuse are lamentably, and notoriously, poor. Even such a pedestrian and im-
portant variable as the potency-adjusted price of cannabis (which might be
thought of as the price ofa gram ofTHe, the primary active agent) is simply
unknown, since seized cannabis is not systematically assayed. The picture is
somewhat betterfor heroin and cocaine, which are routinely assayed for purity,
but even there the quality ofthe price data is nothing to write home about.
Even if money price were well measured, the other components of what
Mark Moore (1973) has called "effective price"-perceivedrisk oftaking the
drug, perceived risk of acquiring the drug, and search time-would remain
almost entirely unmeasured.
With respect to consumption, econometric analysis perforce relies primar-
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ily on survey data from such sources as the National Household Survey on
Drug Abuse (NHSDA) and the National Longitudinal Survey ofYouth. These
samples are drawn from the general population, and the sampling procedures
are weighted against the subpopulation ofdrug users, and even more against
the smaller subpopulation offrequent, high-dose users. (Heavy users are more
likely than average to live at hard-to-sample locations, and less likely than av-
erage to want to talk with government-sponsored interviewers.) As a result, the
NHSDA misses about three-quarters ofthe heavy cocaine users.
Since all drugs, except for cigarettes, have highly skewed consumption
distributions that more or less follow Pareto's 80/20 law (four-fifths of the
consumption accounted for by one-fifth ofthe users), missing the heavy users
badly distorts the overall consumption picture. Projecting NHSDA answers
about the frequency ofcocaine consumption onto the national population gen-
erates an estimated total volume ofabout 30 metric tons per year, orabout one-
tenth ofthe estimated true volume ofabout 300 tons per year.
Thus, the light users, whose overall contribution to consumption is negligi-
ble and whose behavior patterns are quite different from the behavior patterns
ofheavy users, dominate the data sets and therefore the analyses. The samples
of very heavy users are too small (and too atypical ofheavy users generally)
to permit mere reweighting to solve the problem: Though it appears that three-
quarters of heavy cocaine users are arrested in the course of any given year,
only one-tenth of the NHSDA self-reported heavy users report ever having
been arrested.
As for behavioral economics, the chief issue as I see it is how to relate its
findings to the actual phenomena and to the concepts ofpure microeconomics.
In particular, the concept ofthe price elasticity ofdemand needs to be handled
very carefully.
The textbook definition ofelasticity holds income constant. In studying the
consumption ofgoods that make up small portions ofconsumers' budgets, this
is oflittle importance; the price ofrazor blades does not measurably influence
the labor supply ofthose who shave. But heavy users ofexpensive illicit drugs
spend very large portions of their total budgets on the drugs they buy, and it
seems reasonable to speculate that one effect of higher prices might be in-
creased efforts to secure income, including by theft. This is sometimes referred
to as evidence of inelastic demand, but as David Boyum has pointed out, a
heroin addict who keeps his consumption constant as price rises by committing
more burglaries is not showing inelastic demand in the textbook sense. Behav-
ioral economics may have a great deal to teach us about the impacts of drug
prices on the markets for licitand illicitlabor, but this needs to be distinguished
from the measurement ofprice elasticity.
Similarly, empirical drug abusers do spend money on things other than
drugs, and could greatly increase their disposable income for nondrug pur-
chases by cutting back somewhat on their drug purchases. This limits the rele-
vance offindings from experiments in which only drugs are available for hypo-
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Now to what I see as the major conceptual issue: the concept of "rational
addiction." This phrase can be used in (at least) three distinct senses, for which
I have attempted to supply descriptive labels:
"Minimal rationality. " This means only that the law of demand applies to
drug taking, and that drug taking is controlledin partby its contingencies, even
for those who are addicted-those who have impaired volition or an impover-
ishedchoice set orboth due to priordrug taking, and whose currentdrug taking
is perceived by themselves and others as problematic.
There is much loose talk around, in both medical and policy circles, about
the disease model of addiction, suggesting that the discovery that for some
people drug taking is a pathological behavior somehow means that addicts do
not respond to prices or contingencies. If that's all the "rational" in "rational
addiction" means, then it represents a much-needed corrective to such loose
talk, and there is no reason to object to it.
"Foresight only. " This means that consumers ofaddictive drugs are capable
of forecasting future prices and, in particular, the impact on their own future
budgets oftheir own (predictable) habit formation. Thus, current consumption
will be sensitive to predicted changes in long-run prices. Buttaking such drugs
can still reduce overall expected utility, in particular by increasing rates of
time preference.
"Global maximization." This means that the use of addictive drugs reflects
the rational pursuit ofmaximum (expected) utility. Initiation, persistance, de-
sistance, and return to use are all choices made with perfect foresight and self-
command. This seems to imply that addictive drugs produce consumers' sur-
pluses for their addicted users.
Global maximization as a description ofaddictive behavior has a strong im-
plication: that drug addiction is not a social problem-orwould not be a prob-
lem in the absence of prohibition-except for its external costs. If all of the
consumers are enjoying surpluses-atleastexpected surpluses as evaluated ex
ante-then we should erect policies such as Pigouvian taxation to correct the
externality problem and then go home. (Drug addiction mightreduce total util-
ity by increasing discount rates, but that effect should also be rationally taken
into account by a perfectly rational consumer.)
Such a model would be consistent with the existence ofa class ofunhappy
addicts expressing regret about their initial decision to start taking drugs; they
would simply be the unlucky ones for whom the risk of addiction became a
reality. Their net losses would, still assuming rationality, have to be less than
the net gains ofthose who managed to use without becoming addicted, plus a
premium for risk.
But that model would make very strong predictions about the behavior of
users, addicted and nonaddicted alike:
1. They would seek to buy at the minimum (expected, discounted) price.
2. They would apply the same discount rate to drugs and other goods.
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4. As expected-utility maximizers, they would be risk averse (given dimin-
ishing marginal utility for income), again for drugs and other goods alike.
5. No drug user would ever do anything that he or she expected later to
regret; that is, self-command would not be a problem.
6. In the absence of self-command problems, there would be no self-
strategy; that is, no costly attempts to prevent, or mitigate, anticipated irratio-
nal behavior.
Now these predictions, it seems to me, are clearly falsified by observations
ofactual and laboratory behavior. To give only four examples:
1. Heroin addicts, who spend large proportions oftheir total income on the
drug, do not take advantage ofthe very large discounts-in addition to reduced
transactions costs-available from buying several days' supply in bulk. They
report that this is because they know themselves to be incapable ofnot using
the entire purchase at one sitting. (Since I behave the same way about candy, I
do not find such reports implausible.)
2. Laboratory-measured rates oftime preference are higher for heroin than
for other reinforcers.
3. People who have gone through a period of addictive use, and then
stopped, report fearing that they will return to addictive use.
4. Contingency managementworks as adrug treatment modality even when
the sums involved are negligible compared to the cost of maintaining a drug
habit.
This is not, I submit, puzzling, except from the viewpoint that views all
behavior as necessarily maximizing. Melioration, hyperbolic discounting, and
prospect theory all provide models ofconsistent, but not globally maximizing,
behavior, and all have something to contribute to understanding the phenomena
ofdrug abuse (Heyman 1996).
Full rationality is an idealized abstraction ofsome aspects ofbehavior, and
it should not surprise us that actual behavior conforms to its normative precepts
only imperfectly. The extent ofthose imperfections will vary with the individ-
ual, the topic ofdecision, and the circumstances. I would propose that we un-
derstand an addictive drug (or other behavior, such as gambling) as one that is
unusually susceptible to some subset ofbehavioral deviations from full ratio-
nality. That will make addictive drugs and other activities different-in degree
rather than in kind, but in important degree-from the activities for which full
rationality provides a workably good description ofactual behavior.
This third, global interpretation ofrational addiction, with which I approached
reading the papers in this volume, is, I believe, the way that theory is generally
understood by those outside the circle of rational addiction researchers. That
will excuse my devoting so much space to tearing down what I am now told is
a straw man: The correctinterpretation is said to be what I call above "foresight
only." Drug consumers, including addicts, are foresighted rather than myopic
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inappropriately high rates oftime preference, thus reducing consumers' utility.
That leaves open the question ofwhy addicts' rationality is impaired in such a
specific way. It also, I believe, leaves unexplained the phenomenaofpreference
reversal, inconsistent discount rates across goods, and self-strategizing.
Abandoning my (never very successful) attempt to impersonate a social sci-
entist, I now resume my true identity as apolicy analyst and ask, Whatfindings
from econometrics and behavioral economics would be ofmost use in facilitat-
ing better public policies?
First and foremost, we need better knowledge ofthe effects ofprice on con-
sumption and other behavior (and, ideally, ofthe effects ofenforcement effort
on price).
Here, aggregates are oflimited use. As with many commodities, the relevant
elasticities will vary not only across drugs but across user subtypes and prob-
ably over time. (In addition, as Boyum [1992] has suggested, elasticities for up-
ward and downward price movements may not be symmetric, and overall con-
sumption patterns may display hysteresis.) Since the welfare implications of
changes in consumption levels depend crucially on whose consumption is
changing, the overall point elasticity is ofonly modest help in shaping policy.
Ideally we could use a full set of own-and cross-price elasticity functions,
broken down into effects on initiation, persistance/desistance, intensification,
quit, and relapse.
The possibility that two drugs could be substitutes contemporaneously but
complements over time (which could be the case iftwo drugs both satisfied the
same underlying demand for intoxication, but that demand was an increasing
function ofpast intoxication) needs to be taken seriously, and might be profit-
ably explored using laboratory animals.
The possibility that changing drug prices could change the licit and illicit
labor supply ofsome users needs to be explored empirically, recognizing that
this is not the same as the elasticity question.
Almost nothing quantitative is known about the effects on consumption of
nonprice variables, including search time. To be productive, this work will
probably require recruiting user panels.
As Peter Reuter (1997) has pointed out, about three-quarters ofthe current
efforts to reduce illicit drug use consist of enforcement, aimed presumably at
increasing prices and search times. But next to nothing is known about how
the magnitude ordesign ofsuch efforts influences these intermediate variables,
or about how the intermediates change drug consumption orother variables of
social interest such as crime. (As Reuter has also pointed out, the research
budget is even more strongly skewed toward basic biology and the study of
drug treatment than the operating budget is toward enforcement.) To study
enforcement econometrically, it will be necessary to design and implement
much more disaggregated and precise models and measures of enforcement
efforts and outputs.
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course, limited in part by the politics ofdrug abuse control and by some agen-
cies' limited appetite for analysis, especially analysis likely to disrupt current
patterns ofpractice. In fairness, however, it must be said that those constraints
are not, for the most part, currently binding, since our knowledge is not now
either robust enough or precise enough to allow much in the way of policy
advice. Perhaps when we know better what to do there will be greater willing-
ness than is now apparent to make use ofthat knowledge.
References
Boyum, David. 1992. Reflections on economic theory and drug enforcement. Ph.D.
diss., Harvard University, ch. 4.
Heyman, Gene M. 1996. Resolving the contradictions of addiction. Behavioral and
Brain Sciences 19:561-610.
Moore, Mark. 1973. Policies to achieve discrimination in the effective price ofheroin.
American Economic Review 63:270-79.
Reuter, Peter. 1997. Can we make prohibition work better? Some consequences of
avoiding the ugly. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 141 (3):
262-75.v
Substance Abuse
and Employment